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Pursuant to a plea 
guilty to felony 
forty-three-year~old \f\/ayne 0, 
conduct with a child under 
subsequently filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) motion to withdraw his 
, II 
which the district court denied. Mr. Anderson then filed a motion to reconsider the 
district couri's order denying the withdrawal of his guilty which the district court 
denied. The district court imposed a unified sentence of forty years, with fifteen 
years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Anderson that the district court abused its discretion 
when it did not permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. Anderson also that 
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer James of the Nampa Police Department was dispatched to a sex offense 
call in Nampa. (presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Child 
Protective Services had advised that a family member of thirteen-year-old C.A called to 
report that Mr. Anderson, C.A's father, had been sexually offending against C.A (PSI, 
p.2.) 
Officers contacted Cassie Anderson, C.A's mother and Mr. Anderson's wife. 
(PSI, pp.2-3.) Mrs. Anderson stated that her oldest daughter, E.A., had told her that 
Mr. Anderson had touched C.A (PSI, p.2.) C.A. had stated that Mr. Anderson had put 
his hand in her underwear and touched her buttocks while she was sleeping. (PSI, p.2; 
Tr., Apr. 16, 2012, p.12, Ls.11-24.) C.A. reportedly stated that it was the only time 
Mr. Anderson sexually abused her. (PSI, p.2.) 
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Anderson had also with seventeen-year-old D.A., her other 
(PSI, p .) D.A. reported that Mr. Anderson had touching her on the 
and in the pants several times in the past few months. (PSI, p.2.) When 
confronted Mr. Anderson about it, he admitted to touching the girls and 
to commit suicide. I, .) 
later, C.A. D.A. were interviewed at Justice 
I, C.A. stated that sometime during the school 
put his down her pants and underwear while she was 
Mr. Anderson had 
on the couch in 
messing with 
they moved to 
living room. (PSI, p. ) D.A. stated that Mr. Anderson had 
her when they were living in a trailer park in 
Nampa, he progressed to touching her breasts on top on her clothes and then under her 
shirt and bra. (PSI, p.2.) A few months after Mr. Anderson began touching D.A.'s 
breasts, he reportedly started to place his hand on her crotch, and then later put his 
hand down her pants and underwear to engage in manual-genital stimulation. (PSI, 
p.2.) D.A. stated that Mr. Anderson at one time pulled up her shirt and pulled down her 
pants and underwear while she was sleeping on the couch. (PSI, p.2.) D.A told him to 
stop, but Mr. Anderson begged her to do it again. (PSI, p.2.) D.A began sleeping with 
the light on, and threatened to scream. (PSI, p.2.) 
When officers went to interview Mr. Anderson, they interrupted him while he was 
in the process of taking his own life. (Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.8, Ls.9-11.) Officers later 
interviewed Mr. Anderson, who stated that he had touched D.A's breasts and genitals 
multiple times, both over the clothes and skin to skin. (PSI, p.2.) He reportedly stated 
that he had been "grooming" D.A from when she was about thirteen or fourteen, before 
they moved to Nampa from Eagle. (PSI, pp.2-3.) He denied any additional incidents 
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with his oldest daughter, (PSI, p.3.) Shortly after his interview with the police, 
Mr. Anderson was hospitalized in a mental facility for several days. (Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, 
In County No. CR 11-31 Mr. Anderson was charged, for the 
D.A., with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, 
in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508, one count of sexual abuse of a child under 
the of years, in violation of I.C. § 18-1506. (R., pp.6-7.) Additionally, 
Mr. Anderson was charged with two mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements 
to I. § 19-2520G(2), on account of his conviction for conduct with a 
minor under on September 24, 1998 in Lake County, and his being 
required to register as a sex offender pursuant to I.C. § 18-8304. (R., pp.8-9.) The 
victim of the prior lewd conduct was E.A. (PSI, p.3.) The district court ordered 
Mr. Anderson to have no contact with D.A. and all minors. (R., p.16.) Mr. Anderson 
initially entered pleas of not guilty and denied the sentencing enhancements. (R., p.20.) 
No. CR 2011-31445*C was also consolidated with Canyon County No. CR 2011-
21567*C. 1 (R., p.69.) 
Mr. Anderson later entered into a plea agreement with the State. (R, pp.70-71.) 
Under the plea agreement, Mr. Anderson would plead guilty to the lewd conduct charge 
and the related I.C. § 19-2520G(2) sentencing enhancement requiring a 15-year 
mandatory minimum sentence in No. CR 2011-31445*C. (R, p.71; Tr., Feb. 14, 2012, 
p.6, Ls.17-22.) In exchange, the State would dismiss the sexual abuse charge and 
related sentencing enhancement in No. CR 2011-31445*C, and dismiss No. CR 2011-
1 In No. CR 2011-21567*C, Mr. Anderson was charged, for the allegations regarding 
C.A. (see R, pp.58-59), with one count of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen and a 
mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement (PSI, p.4; R, pp.22, 28-29, 98). 
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21 in its entirety. 1.) would recommend imposing a 
would include with the indeterminate portion of the 
open for Anderson would enter an Alford plea. 
(R., 1.) inquiries as to the of the it told 
that you are entering your 
Alford pleas of guilty [to and related sentencing enhancement] 
of your own and voluntary " (Tr., Feb. 1 201 p.24, 1 
district court then Mr. Anderson's Afford plea. (R., p.75; Tr., Feb. 1 201 
Ls.22~24.) 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. an Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., motion stated that "[t]he day prior to 
changing his plea, Defendant spoke to his wife who unduly, and perhaps unlawfully, 
persuaded Defendant to plead guilty in these matters thus making his change of plea 
not freely and voluntarily done." (R., p.B4.) 
Mr. Anderson also filed an affidavit in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. (R., pp.90-93.) In the affidavit, Mr. Anderson stated, "I will do almost anything in 
order to fulfill the wishes of my wife." (R., p.91.) Mr. Anderson related that, in a 
video/phone conversation with Mrs. Anderson before the change of plea, "I tried to 
explain to my wife that I was 'fighting for my life.' . .. In response, my wife told me to 
'stop trying to save my life' and that I was harming our children. She also made it 
absolutely clear that she wanted me to plead guilty." (R., p.91.) Mr. Anderson stated 
that "[a]s a result of hearing my wife tell me that she did not want me to live anymore, I 
2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
4 
was completely devastated mentally and emotionally. . .. I decided that I was going to 
guilty so I could fulfill my wife's wishes die in prison." (R., pp.91-92.) 
At the change of plea hearing, "still about what my had told me 
the " Mr. Anderson "merely questions presented to me by the 
In a that I thought judge taking I was 
focused on giving the judge truthful answers." (R., p.92.) About a 
Mr. Anderson entered his Alford plea, he truly reflect upon understand 
what I had done," and came to realize "that I had acted in haste, and while under the 
influence of pain and grief caused by what my wife had said to me. , p.92.) 
district court held a hearing on motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
(R., p.86.) At the hearing, Mr. Anderson's counsel that when Mr. Anderson 
submitted his change of plea, "essentially, that was not a knowingly and voluntary plea. 
He was under the influence of what his wife had told him. He was deeply depressed." 
(Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.8, Ls.1-4.) 
The State argued that the district court had asked Mr. Anderson whether anyone 
had tried to pressure him into changing his plea, and Mr. Anderson indicated that had 
not happened. (Tr., Apr. 9, p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.3.) Further, the State argued that 
"when you're looking at voluntariness and you're looking at whether or not an individual 
was coerced into a change of plea, that is typically associated with State action." 
(Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.11, Ls.5-B.) According to the State, "[Mr. Anderson's] wife is not a 
State actor, his wife is not an individual who was acting at the State's direction in an 
effort to get him to change his plea." (Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.11, Ls.13-15.) Thus, the State 
5 
that Anderson had shown had cause to his guilty plea. 
, Apr. 2012, p.1 L.23 p.1 L.1.) The district court review a copy of 
recording of the video/phone conversation 
held a "'6/'A" hearing on to guilty 
. (R., p.9S.) Anderson's giving 
[Mr. Anderson] when he was deciding or 
"his interpretation based on his affidavit was, you know what, you need to plead 
guilty. You need stop fighting. You know, you're going to go prison:' 
,Apr. 16, 201 ) Mr. Anderson's continued: "[Mr. Anderson) 
talked about I'm going go to prison. My life is going to over. And his wife basically 
says, no, it's not. ,Just plead guilty." (Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.4, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Anderson's 
counsel asserted that Mr. Anderson, at the change of plea hearing, "just went through 
the motions, said what he felt everyone wanted to hear so he can get it over with. But in 
reality he's reacting to this emotional situation .... " (Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.4, Ls.17-20.) 
The State argued that "just simply because something is emotional doesn't mean 
that it rises to the level of such duress that somebody would enter a change of plea and 
that it would not be knowing and voluntary." (Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.5, Ls.17-21.) Further, 
the State related that Mrs. Anderson told Mr. Anderson: "Nobody wants you to die. 
Your family supports you. Your family loves you. We just want you to, you know, not 
hurt everybody in the process." (Tr., Apr. 16, 2012, p.7, Ls.17-20.) The State also 
3 The State also mentioned that Mr. Anderson had sent a letter to Mrs. Anderson 
instructing C.A and D.A to change their stories. (Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.12, Ls.15-19.) 
The district court had previously indicated that the letter would be admissible evidence. 
(Tr., Apr. 9,2012, p.12, Ls.20-24.) 
6 
that Mr. Anderson was familiar with the criminal court """'TOleYl 
Anderson was not a actor. (Tr., Apr. 16,201 
p.8, L.1.) The district court took the matter under 
a written decision. (R., 96.) 





indicated it would 
um on 
Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw his guilty (R., pp.97~101.) The district court 
"As by the Idaho [Court of Appeals] in v. Hans/ovan, [1 Idaho 530, 
537 -38 (Ct. App. 2008)], anxiety and pressure from the defendant's family (here 
Defendant's wife) not constitute impermissible coercion." (R., pp.100-01.) The 
district court concluded Defendant was not unduly or unlawfully coerced into 
pleading guilty by his " (R., p.i 01.) Further, "an assertion of innocence, by itself, is 
not grounds to withdraw a guilty plea." (R., 101.) Thus, the district court denied the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (R., p.i01.) 
Mr. Anderson subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the district court's order 
denying the withdrawal of his guilty plea. (R., pp.i05-07.) In the motion, Mr. Anderson 
asserted that he was "severely depressed" after talking to his wife before the change of 
plea hearing, and was still depressed when he entered his Alford plea. (R., pp.i05-06.) 
He also asserted that the district court did not adequately question him as to his mental 
and emotional state when he entered the guilty plea, and his guilty plea was not freely, 
knowingly, or voluntarily made because he "was under undue mental duress and severe 
depression." (R., p.i06.) The district court indicated that its analysis in the 
memorandum decision denying the motion to withdraw a guilty plea was just as 
applicable to the motion to reconsider, and denied Mr. Anderson's motion to reconsider. 
(R., p.i 09.) 
7 
the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court 
unified of life imprisonment, with mandatory minimum of fifteen years 
(R, p.11 0.) Mr. Anderson's counsel that the district court impose 
of with riTTr""rI fixed. (R, p.'110.) The district 
a unified years, with 4 , pp.11 
1 
Anderson filed a timely of Appeal. 11 .) 
4 The district court also ordered that Mr. Anderson would have no contact with D.A. and 
C.A. until July 16, 2052. (R., p.118.) 
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1. Did the district court abuse discretion it did not permit Mr. Anderson to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 





its d when it 
permit to The Court of has outlined 
standard of review for of motion to withdraw a guilty made, as in this 
prior to sentencing: 
Idaho Criminal governs the withdrawal of guilty 
granting or denial of such a motion is within the discretion the trial court 
V\/hen the motion is made before the pronouncement of sentence, such 
discretion should liberally exercised. Before sentencing, the 
inconvenience to the court and prosecution resulting from a change of 
plea is ordinarily slight as compared to protecting the right of the accused 
to trial by jury. Presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic 
right; the defendant has the burden of showing a "just reason" exists to 
withdraw the plea. We review the decision of the trial court for an abuse 
of discretion. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on 
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: 
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Appellate review of the denial of a 
motion to withdraw a plea is limited to whether the district court exercised 
sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. 
State v. Hans/ovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). As 
discussed above, when a withdrawal of a plea is sought before sentencing, the district 
court's "discretion should be liberally exercised." State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298 
(1990). But even if granting the motion would not prejudice the State, a motion to 
withdraw a plea may be denied if the defendant has not presented and supported a 
10 
"plausible reason for withdrawal the plea." State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162 
(Ct App. 2003). 
A just reason for permitting withdrawal of a guilty plea exists if the plea is 
involuntary. Hans/ovan, 1 "A threshold question is whether the 
of guilty was and voluntarily " State v. 118 
Idaho 957, 959 must be granted if the plea is 
Id. In other words, "[i]f plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due 
process standards, which require a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligency, then . . . 'just established as a matter of " State v. 
Stone, 1 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. 2009). "However, a constitutional in the 
plea is not in order to ... a 'just reason.'" Id. If the appellate court on 
review determines that the guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, 
it then proceeds to determine whether any other "just reason" exists for withdrawal of 
the plea. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959. 
A court determines whether a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly through a 
three-part inquiry involving: 
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; 
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty. 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993). "On appeal, Idaho law requires that 
voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record 
as a whole." Id. 
In this case, the district court concluded that Mr. Anderson was not unduly or 
unlawfully coerced into pleading guilty by his wife, and thus denied his motion to 
11 
withdraw his guilty (R, p.101.) district court Anderson's motion to 
it that in the decision denying the 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea was just to motion to 
(R, '109.) 
under applicable a should 
withdrawal of a guilty if a just reason the plea, if 
withdrawing the not prejud 1 Idaho at 
a just reason to withdraw Permitting Mr. Anderson 
his would not Thus, the district court 
its discretion it did not permit to withdraw his guilty 
the district court did not act consistently with applicable legal 
A Just Reason Existed To Withdraw Mr. Anderson's Guilty Plea 
Mr. Anderson asserts that a just reason existed to withdraw his guilty plea. A just 
reason existed to withdraw Mr. Anderson's plea because his plea was rendered 
involuntary by the combination of family pressure and severe depression he felt at the 
time he entered the plea. Alternatively, even if Mr. Anderson's plea was not rendered 
involuntary, the combination of family pressure and severe depression still provided a 
just reason to withdraw the plea. 
1. Mr. Anderson's Guilty Plea Was Rendered Involuntary By The 
Combination of Family Pressure and Severe Depression He Felt At The 
Time He Entered The Plea 
Mr. Anderson asserts that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the 
combination of family pressure and severe depression he felt at the time he entered the 
12 
As a just reason for permitting the of a guilty 
if the is involuntary. Hans/ovan, 1 Idaho 
In support of the original motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Mr. Anderson 
that his plea was involuntary to plead guilty by 
his wife, Mrs. Anderson. (R, pp.91 .) Additionally, Mr. 
encouraged the court to grant the original motion 
stated that Mr. Anderson deeply 
when he 
withdraw the guilty 
the 
(Tr., Apr. 9, 201 p.8, L.4.) in his motion to reconsider, Mr. Anderson asserted that he 
was suffering from severe depression the time he entered the guilty plea. 
(R, pp.1 05-06.) 
A plea of guilty is involuntary if the was coerced to plead guilty. 
Hanslovan, 1 Idaho 537. "If an innocent would have felt compelled to plead guilty 
in light of the circumstances, it can properly be said that the plea was involuntary." Id. 
"A plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is improperly induced by ignorance, 
fear or fraud." Id. However, it is well-established that "anxiety and pressure from the 
defendant's family situation do not constitute impermissible coercion," because such 
family pressure is "not attributable to the state." Id. at 537-38. 
Further, a defendant's mental health issues, such as severe depression, may 
leave the defendant mentally incompetent to enter a guilty plea and thus make any plea 
entered by the defendant involuntary. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 605 & 606; 
see also Dopp, 124 Idaho at 483-84 ("Oopp has asserted that because he was under 
severe emotional stress prior to entering his guilty pleas, he did not enter those pleas 
voluntarily."), State v. Wilhelm, 135 Idaho 111, 115 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Wilhelm argues 
that he pleaded guilty in reliance upon certain misrepresentations made by the district 
13 
and that the district court failed to inquire properly into his 




filed in suppori of the motion 
his 
him to plead guilty, emotionally 




(R., pp.91 Mr. entered his guilty while he this family 
from Ms. Anderson, because he was still distraught from his conversation with 
his wife. (R., p.92.) As Mr. Anderson's counsel put it during the first hearing on the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, "[Mr. Anderson] was under the influence of what his 
had told him." At the second hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
. Anderson's counsel further asseried that Mr. Anderson, at the change of plea 
hearing, "just went through the motions, said what he felt everyone wanted to hear so 
he can get it over with. But in reality he's reacting to this emotional situation .... " 
(Tr., Apr. 16,2012, pA, Ls.17-20.) Thus, Mr. Anderson demonstrated that he felt family 
pressure from his wife, Ms. Anderson, when he entered the plea. 
In his motion to reconsider, Mr. Anderson asserted that he was "severely 
depressed" after talking to his wife before the change of plea hearing, and was still 
depressed when he entered his plea. (R., pp.105-06.) While Mr. Anderson was never 
formally diagnosed with a mental illness, his attempt to take his own life and mental hold 
demonstrate that severe depression, in the words of his counsel, was "very real for 
him." (Tr., July 16, 2012, pA, Ls.11-19; see Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.8, Ls.9-11.) Further, 
Mr. Anderson's counsel stated that after Mrs. Anderson told Mr. Anderson to plead 
guilty, "[i]t increased his depression. And so when he is in front of [the district court] the 
14 
moming his plea, giving away all his rights, he was not in the right 
mind." (Tr., July 1 2012, Ls.1'l-'14.) Mr. Anderson that, 
, "I saw no purpose in my life. And for a long time while I was in here I 
" (Tr., July 1 2012, p.9, L24 p.10, L,2.) He district court, 
in a frame of where you to kill yourself, can you really 
you're in right frame of mind, that you're making the right for yourself 
(Tr., July '1 '12, p.10, Thus, Mr. demonstrated 
he was severely 
Anderson 
combination of family 
Admittedly, family 
<lTOren the plea. the time he 
that his guilty 
and severe 
was rendered involuntary by 
he felt at the time he 
alone does not constitute coercion that would make a 
plea involuntary, Hans/ovan, 1 Idaho at 537-38. However, the family 
exerted on Mr. Anderson by his wife was not the only factor that influenced his entering 
a guilty plea. Mr. Anderson was also suffering from severe depression at the time he 
entered the plea. Indeed, when Ms. Anderson pressured Mr. Anderson to plead guilty 
during their conversation, "[i]t increased his depression." (Tr., July 16, 2012, p.5, Ls.11-
14.) He was still under a cloud of family pressure and severe depression when he 
entered the guilty plea. (R., pp.91-92, 105-06.) This combination of family pressure 
and severe depression left Mr. Anderson unable to enter a voluntary plea, and his guilty 
plea was therefore involuntary. Thus, a just reason existed for withdrawal of the plea 
because the combination of family pressure and severe depression rendered 
Mr. Anderson's guilty plea involuntary. 
15 
that even if his was not involuntary, 
withdraw the plea. if the combination of family and 
severe Anderson the time he entered the plea did not render the 
involuntary, it a just reason to withdraw the 
previously , under the applicable of discretion , if an 
appellate court on review determines that a guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily it then determine whether any other "just 
for Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at When a the 
withdrawal of 
exercised." 
the district court's "discretion liberally 
117 Idaho 298. "Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the 
court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared to 
protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury." Hans/ovan, 147 Idaho at 535. 
Mr. Anderson submits that, even if the combination of family pressure and severe 
depression he felt at the time did not render the plea involuntary, it nonetheless 
provided a just reason to withdraw the plea. By bringing the combination of family 
pressure and severe depression to the district court's attention, alongside evidence of 
that family pressure and severe depression, Mr. Anderson presented and supported a 
"plausible reason for withdrawal of the plea." See Akin, 139 Idaho at 162. Again, the 
standard for granting the withdrawal of pleas prior to sentencing is a liberal one. See 
Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298. Thus, even if Mr. Anderson's plea was not involuntary, a 
just reason existed to withdraw the plea. 
16 
Anderson 
not the State. 
that permitting him to withdraw his guilty 
If a defendant shows that just reason 
would 
for 
"may avoid the granting of motion by 
of the 1 Idaho 
did not prejudice from 
of Anderson's guilty Apr. 1 201 Li5 L.i0.) 
Additionally, the district court did not conclude that permitting Mr. Anderson to withdraw 
the would prejudice the State. I pp.98~i 01.) Rather, the district court only 
determined that Mr. Anderson had not shown that a just reason existed to his 
plea. (R., pp.98~101.) Thus, permitting Mr. Anderson to withdraw his would not 
have prejudiced the 
In sum, a just reason existed to grant Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea. Permitting him to withdraw his plea would not have prejudiced the State. 
Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it did not permit Mr. Anderson to 
withdraw his guilty plea, because the district court did not act consistently with the 
applicable legal standards. Mr. Anderson's conviction should be vacated and his case 










its discretion when it imposed 
the 
Where a defendant contends that the court imposed an excessively 
harsh the appellate court will conduct an independent of record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the character of the offender, and 
protection of the public interest. 103 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 1 
"A defendant challenging his or her on appeal need not show special 
circumstances in order for the appellate court to review the entire sentence, including 
the indeterminate portion." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 n:l (2007). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979». Mr. Anderson does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Anderson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and 
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(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. Mr. his 
any of 
Mr. Anderson submits that, because the district court did not give adequate 
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by court is 
considering any view of the facts. Specifically, the district court did not 
adequately consider Mr. Anderson's military Mr. Anderson in the Army 
i'Jational Guard from 19B7 to 1 served full-time in the Army from 1 to 1 
, p.B.) was Crewman had been given leadership training. 
(PSI, p.B.) At the end of his service, he was honorably discharged. (PSI, p.B.) As 
Mr. Anderson's counsel noted, "[Mr. Anderson] served successfully in the military." 
(Tr., July 16, 2012, p.21, Ls.7-B.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Anderson's military 
service should have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Anderson's mental 
health issues. A district court must consider evidence of a defendant's mental condition 
offered at the time of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2523(1). As described above, 
Mr. Anderson asserted that he was suffering from severe depression. At the sentencing 
hearing, Mr. Anderson's counsel again directed the district court's attention to the facts 
that Mr. Anderson had attempted suicide and had been placed in a mental health ward. 
(Tr., July 16, 2012, p.23, Ls.8-19.) Mr. Anderson's counsel also mentioned that 
Mr. Anderson had been advised to seek mental health treatment, and "while he is 
incarcerated hopefully he would get some mental health treatment, and that will also 
help him to be a better citizen, a better person, and less of a threat to the community 
19 
(Tr., July 16, 2012, p.23, L.17 p.24, LA.) Adequate 
r. Anderson mental health should resulted in a 
the district court did the mitigating 
is ex(;es considering Thus, 
Anderson that district court abused its the 
sentence of forty years, with fifteen years fixed. Mr. should 
the above reasons, Mr. Anderson respectfully that this 
his judgment of conviction and remand the case with direction to permit him to withdraw 
of guilty, Alternatively, Mr. Anderson respectfully that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 2013. 
BEN PATRICK 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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